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Public goods, like food sharing and social health systems,
may prosper when prior agreements to contribute are feasi-
ble and all participants commit to do so. Yet, free-riders may
exploit such agreements (Han et al., 2013), requiring then
committers to decide whether to enact the public good when
others do not commit. So deciding removes all benefits from
free-riders but also from those who are willing to establish
the beneficial resource. Here we discuss our work published
in (Han, Pereira, and Lenaerts, 2015) and a journal sub-
mission in (Han, Pereira, and Lenaerts), wherein we show,
within the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game
(PGG) and using methods of Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) (Sigmund, 2010), that (i) implementing extra mea-
sures, delimiting benefits to free-riders, often leads to more
favorable societal outcomes, especially in larger groups and
highly beneficial public goods situations, even if so doing
is costlier, and (ii) when restriction mechanism is not avail-
able, participation level (i.e. how many other players commit
to the PGG cooperation) plays a crucial role in the decision
making of commitment proposers, for their survival as well
as for promoting the emergence of cooperation. Hence, there
exist ethical fine tunings to be observed whenever establish-
ing PGGs, be they for humans or non-humans, for otherwise
the supporting joint moral ground may escape from under
everyone’s feet.
PGG is the standard framework for studying emergence of
cooperation in group interaction settings (Sigmund, 2010).
In a PGG, players meet in groups of a fixed size, and all
players can choose whether to cooperate and contribute to
the public good or to defect without contributing to it. The
total contribution is multiplied by a constant factor and is
then equally distributed among all. Hence, contributors al-
ways gain less than free-riders (non-contributors), leading
to the destruction of cooperation, as predicted by evolution-
ary dynamics (Sigmund, 2010). In this scenario, arranging
a prior commitment or agreement is an essential ingredient
to encourage cooperative behavior, as abundantly observed
both in the natural world (Nesse, 2001) and lab experiments
(Cherry and McEvoy, 2013). Prior agreements help clarify
the intentions and preferences of other players (Han, Pereira,
and Santos, 2012; Han et al., 2015). Hence, refusing to es-
tablish an agreement may be considered as intending or pre-
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ferring not to cooperate (non-committers).
In our work (Han, Pereira, and Lenaerts, 2015), we ex-
tend the PGG to examine commitment-based strategies in
group interactions. Namely, prior to playing the PGG, com-
mitment proposing players ask their co-players to commit
to contribute to the PGG, paying a personal proposer’s cost
to establish that agreement. If all the requested co-players
accept the commitment, the proposers assume that everyone
will contribute. Those individuals that commit, yet later do
not contribute, must compensate the proposers at a cost (Han
et al., 2013; Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2015).
As commitment proposers may encounter non-
committers, they require strategies that can deal with
this type of individuals. The simplest strategy is to not
participate in the creation of the common good. Yet, this
avoidance strategy, AVOID, also removes the benefits for
those that wished to establish the public good. Alternatively,
one can establish boundaries on the common good so that
only those that have committed to make it work have (better)
access or that the benefit non-contributors can acquire is
reduced. This strategy is referred to as RESTRICT. We
compare, both analytically and using numerical simulations,
these two commitment-based strategies when facing various
types of free-riders, from those who do not commit, to
those who commit but later defect, to those who commit
and contribute only when not having to share the cost of
commitment arrangement. Our results lead to two main
conclusions: (i) both strategies can promote the emergence
of cooperation in the one-shot PGG whenever the cost of
arranging commitment is justified with respect to the benefit
of cooperation, thus generalizing results from pairwise
interactions (Han et al., 2013); (ii) RESTRICT, rather than
AVOID, leads to more favorable societal outcomes, in
terms of contribution level, especially when the group size
and/or the benefit of the PGG increase, even if the cost of
restricting becomes quite excessive.
In a parallel modelling work of commitment-based strate-
gic behaviour in the context of the PGG (Han, Pereira, and
Lenaerts), we consider a different set of strategies, envisag-
ing that a restriction measure may not always be possible as
it is costly and takes additional effort to implement. Namely,
before engaging in a group venture individuals often secure
prior commitments from other members of the group, and
based on the level of participation (i.e. how many group
members commit) they can then decide whether it is worth-
while joining the group effort (Nesse, 2001; Sterelny, 2012;
Barrett, 2003). Many group ventures can be launched only
when the majority of the participants commit to contribute to
a common good (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013). A cooperative
hunting effort (both in animals, such as lions and some birds,
and in humans) usually requires a sufficient number of par-
ticipants “on board” to embark (Stander, 1992; Alvard and
Nolin, 2002). While some international agreements require
ratification by all parties before entering into force, most (es-
pecially global treaties) require a minimum less than the to-
tal number of negotiating countries (Cherry and McEvoy,
2013). In group or coalition formation in multi-agent sys-
tems, a sufficient number of participants needs to agree on
the terms of the agreement for it to be binding (Ray, 2007).
In general, it appears that the required participation level
depends on the nature of the problem in place. We show,
again using EGT modelling, that arranging prior commit-
ments while imposing a minimal participation when inter-
acting in groups induces agents to behave cooperatively. Our
analytical and numerical results show that if the cost of ar-
ranging the commitment is sufficiently small compared to
the cost of cooperation, commitment arranging behavior is
frequent, leading to a high level of cooperation in the popu-
lation. Moreover, an optimal participation level emerges de-
pending both on the dilemma at stake and on the cost of ar-
ranging the commitment. Namely, the harsher the common
good dilemma is, and the costlier it becomes to arrange the
commitment, the more participants should explicitly commit
to the agreement to ensure the success of the joint venture.
Furthermore, considering that commitment deals may last
for more than one encounter, we evince that longer-lasting
commitments require a greater strictness upon fake commit-
ters than short ones.
The results we obtain are in close accordance with ex-
perimental economic outcomes obtained by others, see e.g.
(Cherry and McEvoy, 2013; Chen and Komorita, 1994). But
the present work further reveals that, whenever the compen-
sation that needs to be paid by fake committers reaches a
certain threshold, increasing it does not lead to improve-
ment in terms of cooperation levels. It implies that, when
designing norms, whether in real life or a self-organizing
MAS, it is not necessary to have an infinitely large compen-
sation or sanction against law breakers, for a sufficient one is
enough for a wide range of situations. Moreover, the current
paper suggests the need for further behavioural experiments
to explore the effects of varying the essential parameters that
drive commitments.
As commitments have been widely studied in AI and
Computer Science, e.g. to ensure cooperation in self-
organized and distributed (large) multi-agent systems, our
results provided important insights into the design of
such systems whenever dealing with group interactions
(Bonabeau, Dorigo, and Theraulaz, 1999). For instance, the
key to using the potential of self-organized multi-robot sys-
tems (Gerkey and Matari, 2002) is that the robots need to
ensure a high level of cooperation amongst themselves, as
they may have different skill sets, in order to achieve their
tasks successfully. Our group commitment results appear to
provide an appropriate method to ensure cooperation: the
robots can arrange commitments to ensure that a benefi-
cial coalition of skills is obtained and the task is fairly dis-
tributed (Sarker et al., 2014). Non-committers may be ostra-
cized from the group and the mission might not be launched
if the number of committers is too low.
Summing up, ethical fine tunings must be observed when
establishing the norms for Public Good Games, whether for
humans or non-humans, for otherwise one risks that the in-
herently desired common moral ground may become unfea-
sible.
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